Accounting Discretion, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance*
By Robert M. Bowen, Shivaram Rajgopal, Mohan Venkatachalam. 2008
578 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3e6c00afd5b6f1f0f379a14a2815832a6f5abb28
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Shivaram Rajgopal
- Martin Walker
- Beatriz García Osma
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Weili Ge
- John R. Graham
- Catherine Schrand
- W. Guay
In Strategy and Management
- Shivaram Rajgopal
- Martin Walker
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Weili Ge
- John R. Graham
- Patricia M. Dechow
- Beatriz García Osma
- Catherine Schrand
Citations in the corpus
- Non-GAAP earnings and board independence (2011, unknown): “…proportion of outside directors on the board.18 Many potential oversight metrics exist (for example, see Brown and Caylor 2006; Larcker et al. 2007; Bowen et al. 2008).19 However, prior researchers have used board and audit committee independence extensively in examining corporate governance and…”
- Investigating the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management: Evidence from Spain (2016, methodology): “…accruals to meet earnings targets, conistent with prior studies (Warfield et al., 1995; Reynolds and rancis, 2000; Klein, 2002; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 005; Bowen et al., 2008), the magnitude of absolute disretionary accruals is used in this study to assess the extent f earnings management.”
- Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Jordan (2016, background): “Companies that have a higher growth rate are less likely to engage in earnings management practices (Bowen et al., 2003; Abdularahman& Ali, 2006).”
- Product market power, industry structure, and corporate earnings management (2013, background): “Prior empirical research also shows that a weak disciplinary environment allows managers to engage in more earnings manipulation (see, for example, Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam, 2008; Guidry, Leone, and Rock, 1999).”
- CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality (2008, unknown): “Bowen et al. (2008) argue that researchers could extract the portion of earnings quality attributable to governance in the first stage and then evaluate whether such governancerelated earnings quality is negatively associated with future operating performance such as future cash flows in the second ”
- Hometown advantage: The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion (2011, unknown): “Following Bowen et al. (2008), we run the following regression to disentangle whether observed absolute abnormal accruals in our sample reflect opportunism or managerial signaling:”