Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice

By D. Parkes, Lyle Ungar. AAAI/IAAI, 2000

458 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Consensus-Based Decentralized Auctions for Robust Task Allocation (2009, methodology): “To address this dependency, previous combinatorial auction methods [42]–[45] treated each assignment combination (bundle) as a single item for bidding that led to complicated winner selection methods.”
Combinatorial auctions (2007, unknown): “(2005) studied a more general bid construction problem in the context of an iterative ascending framework (Parkes and Ungar 2000).”
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002, background): “The same authors (Parkes and Ungar (2000b)) also study proxy agents with a specification that differs substantially from ours.”
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004, unknown): “Theorem (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002, Parkes and Ungar 2000).”
Using similarity criteria to make issue trade-offs in automated negotiations (2002, background): “However, because representation and reasoning under such a system can be computationally intractable [23, 25, 36] we have been involved in developing approximating decision models for a more limited type of agent that has no explicit representation of the entire game tree.”
Economics and Electronic Commerce: Survey and Directions for Research (2001, background): “iBundle yields at least an order of magnitude computational improvement over the generalized Vickrey auction [308].”