Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games

By Rachel T. A. Croson, Terry L. Boles, J. Murnighan. 2003

231 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a0d475b685213682df64feb15132a0b1437fe046

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Citations in the corpus

On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations, Outside Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games (2004, background): “As in Straub and Murnighan (1995), Croson (1996) , and Boles et al. (2002), the “curse of knowledge” 8 may cause proposers to make higher offers that are”
More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (2013, background): “Both “cheap talk” (Xiao and Houser, 2005; Zultan, 2012) and potential deception over private information aspects in the game (Boles et al., 2000; Croson et al., 2003; Lusk and Hudson, 2004; Koning et al., 2011) have been analyzed.”
Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining (2003, background): “Croson (1996), Croson, Boles and Murnighan (2003) , Forsythe,”
Deception in Experiments: Revisiting the Arguments in Its Defense (2008, unknown): “The results of a still small set of negotiation and strategic interactions (ie, games) studies suggest that being deceived in social interactions has the potential to evoke a wide range of responses, ranging from diminishing desire for future interactions to attribution of untrustworthiness ( Boles,”
The Impact of Information Sharing on Supply Chain Performance under Asymmetric Information (2013, background): “In fact, Croson et al. (2003) show that this type of matching may increase the likelihood for cooperative behavior, due to reputational effects.”
VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS (2007, unknown): “…talk in several experimental studies (e.g., Cason and Gangadharan 2002; Kroll, Mason, and Shogren 1998), others found that cheap talk can increase cooperation even when the equilibriums of the game are suboptimal (e.g., Croson, Boles, and Murnighan 2003; Duffy and Feltovich 2002; Ostrom 2000).”
Trust in Forecast Information Sharing (2011, methodology): “Croson et al. (2003) use ultimatum bargaining experiments to show that deception in early stages of cheap-talk communication is punished in later interactions after it is revealed and trust relationships are impaired.”