Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules

By Guillaume R. Fréchette, John H. Kagel, Steve Lehrer. American Political Science Review, 2002

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Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy (2009, background): “There are experiments on stochastic game models of legislative institutions (see McKelvey 1991; Frechette et al. 2003, 2005; Diermeier & Gailmard 2006, and the references they cite), the effect of sequential versus simultaneous voting methods (see Battaglini et al. 2007, Ali et al. 2008), and many…”
Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? Experimental Evidence (2006, unknown): “Fréchette, Kagel, and Lehrer (2003) and Fréchette, Kagel, and Morelli (2005a, 2005b) perform experiments involving voting and coalitions.”
The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship (2006, result): “the application of the Baron-Ferejohn model and its offshoots in areas such as distributive politics, economic policy making and inter-chamber bargaining has been so extensive that, as Fréchette et al. (2005: 1498) note, it has become ‘the most frequently used formal model of legislative bargaining’”