Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

By Philip A. Haile, Han Hong, Matthew Shum. 2004

260 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ba1039367586031249ce93ee98bf8ef840f0ca1f

Citations in the corpus

• Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions (2008, unknown): “At the same time, bidders can obtain private estimates of the quality and quantity of timber and may have differing beliefs about future market conditions, leading to a potential common value component of valuations (Athey and Levin 2001; Haile, Hong, and Shum 2003).”
• The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs (2012, unknown): “12We also used the methodology by Haile et al. (2006) to uncover “homogenized bids” before and after the format change, addressing endogeneity issues as well.”
• UNIFORM BIAS STUDY AND BAHADUR REPRESENTATION FOR LOCAL POLYNOMIAL ESTIMATORS OF THE CONDITIONAL QUANTILE FUNCTION (2011, unknown): “See Haile et al. (2003) and Marmer and Shneyerov (2012) for a related estimation strategy. There are however just a few references that address the estimation of q(α|x). For the related function q(α|x)∂F(Q(α|x)|x)∂x , Lee and Lee (2008) use a composition approach that nonparametrically estimates ∂ F”
• An empirical model of search with vertically differentiated products (2011, unknown): “As shown by Hong and Shum (2006), an advantage of estimating a non-sequential vis-à-vis a sequential search model is that the estimation of the non-sequential search model can be done without making parametric assumptions on the distribution of search costs or using cost data.”
• Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First‐Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions (2009, unknown): “4 Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003) also introduced such instruments to deal with an endogenous number of bidders.”
• Real Time Pricing and Electricity Markets (2009, unknown): “This approach, which is similar to a method used in Haile, Hong, and Shum (2004), requires that the heterogeneity across auctions a¤ecting segments bids that is observable to competitors is also observable to the econometrician.”
• TESTING FOR A GENERAL CLASS OF FUNCTIONAL INEQUALITIES (2013, unknown): “See, for example, Haile and Tamer (2003), Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003), Aradillas-López, Gandhi, and Quint (2013), and Krasnokutskaya, Song, and Tang (2016) among others.”
• Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions (2007, unknown): “Haile et al (2003) estimate those auctions for which they have greater than approximately 75 observations.”