Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions

By Jakub Kastl. 2011

179 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/25e2e10476d71e5a93a78b337ac237711a97cb89

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Mar Reguant
2. Larry Katz
3. Hunt Allcott
4. Magali A. Delmas
5. Omar Isaac Asensio
6. C. Cattaneo
7. Stefano DellaVigna
8. George Loewenstein

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Mar Reguant
2. Larry Katz
3. Hunt Allcott

In Marketing

1. Mar Reguant
2. Larry Katz
3. Hunt Allcott

Citations in the corpus

• Complementary Bidding Mechanisms and Startup Costs in Electricity Markets (2014, methodology): “It is also possible to use quantity offers to derive first-order conditions (Wolak, 2007; Kastl, 2011).”
• Real Time Pricing and Electricity Markets (2009, background): “This is problematic for the discretization of the continuous FOC, because it implies a cost to bidding additional steps, causing discretization to be biased in the sense of Kastl (2008a).”