Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market
By Ali Hortaçsu, David McAdams. Journal of Political Economy, 2010
248 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4ee97a4ac63a93b8852a1bbd8e9897c68da8b112
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In Management Information Systems
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Citations in the corpus
- Complementary Bidding Mechanisms and Startup Costs in Electricity Markets (2014, methodology): “For multi-unit auctions, Hortaçsu and McAdams (2010) show that, under some assumptions, the distribution of valuations can be non-parametrically estimated even with data from a single auction. which had been shown to exhibit a downward bias during night hours (Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008;…”