Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

By David Masclet, Charles N. Noussair, Steven Tucker, Marie-Claire Villeval. 2003

829 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7a70529101d8efa809a244299d97393ca9b8d125

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Citations in the corpus

False friends are worse than bitter enemies: “Altruistic” punishment of in-group members (2004, background): “Masclet et al. (2003) suggest that competitive social motivation (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2001; Messick, & McClintock, 1968; Saijo & Nakamura, 1995) may explain the punishment of cooperators.”
Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms (2004, neutral): “Masclet et al. (2003), and .”
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories. (2005, background): “Activity in the ACC and AI has also been observed when subjects witness still pictures depicting body parts involved in possibly painful situations [Jackson, Meltzoff and Decety (2005)] or videos showing a needle stinging in the back of a hand [Morrison et al. (2004)].”
A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments (2008, neutral): “…cooperation, it is not obvious whether high e¤ectiveness is better than low e¤ec- 1See, for example, Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Masclet et al. (2003), Carpenter (2005), Nikiforakis (2005), Noussair and Tucker (2005), Page et al. (2005), Sefton et al. (2005), Anderson and…”
Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans (2013, background): “…helpingwhen observed and not helping when anonymous, and much research shows that people give less to others when their actions are anonymous (e.g. Barclay, 2004; Bereczkei et al., 2007; Coricelli et al., 2010; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Hoffman et al., 1994; Masclet et al., 2003; Rege & Telle, 2004).”
Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice (2006, neutral): “In the Masclet et al. (2003) paper average earnings in the monetary punishment condition amount to 57·5% of the maximum possible while in Noussair and Tucker (2005) average earnings are of the order of 63·4% when only monetary punishments are available, and 68% when subjects have recourse to both…”
COMBINING MONETARY AND SOCIAL SANCTIONS TO PROMOTE COOPERATION (2005, methodology): “These first two patterns were noted by Fehr and Gaechter (2000) for monetary sanctions and by Masclet et al. (2003) for nonmonetary sanctions. increase their contributions on average if they receivemore than 10 nonmonetary points.”
The Demand for Punishment (2007, background): “Masclet et al. (2003) show that even " cheap talk " punishment 111 is effective.”
Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment (2005, background): “…may have revised their contributions upwards not simply because this seemed prudent, given the danger of being expelled, but also because while less than a majority of votes did not translate into a monetary punishment, it was read as a stern expression of disapproval, as in Masclet et al. (2003).”