False friends are worse than bitter enemies: “Altruistic” punishment of in-group members

By Mizuho Shinada, T. Yamagishi, Yu Ohmura. 2004

194 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4ef3abc06318b0a98e30a5d57a0c9ae11e6320e6

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

In Safety Research

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions (2010, unknown): “Their existence has even been found in experiments [34,35].”
The Effect of Social Category on Third Party Punishment (2007, unknown): “…from studies in humans (e.g., Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr, 2006; Carpenter and Matthews, 2005; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Houser and Kurzban, 2002; Shinada, Yamagishi, and Ohmura, 2004) and non-human species (e.g., Clutton-Brock, Price, and MacColl, 1992; de Waal, 1982; Hauser, 1992; Manson,…”
The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured populations: score-dependent viability versus score-dependent fertility (2005, background): “Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) show that third-party punishment enforces the social norm, and Shinada et al. (2004) suggest that players punish in-group members more than out-group members in the case of thirdparty punishment, while it is known that a player cooperates with in-group members more than…”
Moral emotions as determinants of third-party punishment: Anger, guilt, and the functions of altruistic sanctions (2009, background): “On the other hand, more severe punishment befalls in-group members violating social-norms than when out-group members harm each other (Shinada, Yamagishi & Ohmura, 2004).”
For Members Only (2014, background): “This speculation is consistent with research showing that the degree of both actual and expected punishment is influenced by perceptions of normative cooperation obligations among in-group members (Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2006; Shinada et al., 2004; Valenzuela & Srivastava, ”
Altruism toward in-group members as a reputation mechanism (2010, background): “Furthermore, since punishment of norm violators comes mostly from members of one’s own group rather than from non-members, as Shinada, Yamagishi, and Ohmura (2004) demonstrated, human sensitivity to monitoring is likely heightened when they are monitored by community members rather than by…”