COMBINING MONETARY AND SOCIAL SANCTIONS TO PROMOTE COOPERATION

By Charles N. Noussair, Steven Tucker. 2005

210 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We employ an experimental approach to consider the impact of a combination of formal and informal sanctions on contribution levels for a specific type of public good. We find that when both sanctions are available, contributions and overall welfare are higher than when only one of the two sanctioning systems is available. The availability of an array of sanctions of varying severity appears to enhance welfare. (JEL C92)

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3e98920f5e69645d0edb006f5245ab8654d296b7

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Citations in the corpus

The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment (2006, background): “In this sense, the best performing punishment institution might be one in which both symbolic and monetary punishments are available (Noussair and Tucker, 2005).”
A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments (2008, unknown): “…than low e¤ec- 1See, for example, Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Masclet et al. (2003), Carpenter (2005), Nikiforakis (2005), Noussair and Tucker (2005), Page et al. (2005), Sefton et al. (2005), Anderson and Putterman (2006), Bochet et al. (2006), Cinyabuguma et al.…”
Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement (2012, result): “A number of subsequent studies have corroborated these results (e.g., Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007; Fudenberg and Pathak, 2010; Masclet et al., 2003; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Sefton et al., 2007).”
Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice (2006, unknown): “In the Masclet et al. (2003) paper average earnings in the monetary punishment condition amount to 57·5% of the maximum possible while in Noussair and Tucker (2005) average earnings are of the order of 63·4% when only monetary punishments are available, and 68% when subjects have recourse to both…”
Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? (2008, unknown): “In that case, Nation A will violate the treaty.3 2See for example Anderson and Putterman (2006), Bochet et al. (2006), Carpenter (2005, 2007), Masclet et al. (2003), Nikiforakis and Normann (2007), Nikiforakis et al. (2007), Noussair and Tucker (2005), Page et al. (2005), Sefton et al. (2005).”
On Behavioral-Environmental Economics (2008, background): “Including behavioral factors in institutional design suggests that one can correct for a global public goods problem more effectively by accounting for the behavioral failure of these willing punishers (also see Noussair and Tucker 2005 ).”
The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, background): “While overall punishment behavior is not affected by socio-demographic variables, we find that highly educated people and people who are a member of at least one voluntary civic organization are more likely to punish cooperators.”
Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment (2007, background): “…to reduce the earnings of the least cooperative individuals in the group is highly effective in raising contribution levels (see for example Yamagishi (1986); Ostrom et al. (1992); Fehr and Gaechter (2000); Carpenter (2005b); Bochet et al. (2005); Masclet et al. (2003); Noussair and Tucker (2005)).”
VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS (2007, unknown): “…if both monetary and nonmonetary sanctions were available, contributions and welfare increased compared to when only one sanction is available (Noussair and Tucker 2005).9 Herein, we combine the key elements of the WGHO and Fehr and Gächter experimental designs to examine whether cooperation…”
Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior (2008, background): “A similar objection may be directed at the few experimental studies that consider symbolic punishment in repeated public goods games (Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair and Tucker, 2005).”