A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments

By Nikos Nikiforakis, Hans-Theo Normann. 2008

430 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b83581e74b9fe55f170113f1907c6eef3aac7134

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Citations in the corpus

The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, neutral): “…parameters contributions increase significantly relative to a no-punishment benchmark (see e.g., Fehr and G ¨ achter (2002) and in particular Egas and Riedl (2008) and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) who provide comparative-static evidence of the impact of punishment effectiveness on cooperation).”
Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement (2012, positive): “A number of subsequent studies have corroborated these results (e.g., Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007; Fudenberg and Pathak, 2010; Masclet et al., 2003; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Sefton et al., 2007).”
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations (2010, neutral): “1 In political science or social psychology, related results have been documented earlier by Yamagishi (1986) or Ostrom et al. (1992), for example.”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, methodology): “…and so on till cooperation is stabilized in the very first stage. crucially on two things: (1) the cost-effectiveness of the punishment; as shown by Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) and Egas and Riedl (2008) it is only when the punishment is low cost and high impact that it also leads to an…”
Cooperation Emergence under Resource-Constrained Peer Punishment (2016, background): “because it has been shown [29] to be more effective in promoting cooperation).”
Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? (2008, neutral): “In that case, Nation A will violate the treaty.3 2See for example Anderson and Putterman (2006), Bochet et al. (2006), Carpenter (2005, 2007), Masclet et al. (2003), Nikiforakis and Normann (2007), Nikiforakis et al. (2007), Noussair and Tucker (2005), Page et al. (2005), Sefton et al. (2005).”
Norm Enforcement in the City: A Natural Field Experiment (2012, positive): “A number of experimental studies have shown that as the cost of punishment increases, the willingness to punish declines (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007; Egas and Riedl, 2007; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008).”
Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study (2012, positive): “This reinforces the findings of Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), the first paper in the literature that investigated the effects of varying the severity of punishment.”
Institution formation in public goods games (2006, positive): “Quadratic scoring rules are known to be incentive compatible and have successfully been used in a number of experiments, for example, by Offerman (1997), Sonnemans et al.”
Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis. (2011, positive): “In these dilemmas, when incentives are added, there is an initial decrease in group payoffs, but over iterations, an increase in such payoffs occurs (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008).”