Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

By Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Peter Hans Matthews, Okomboli Ong’ong’a. 2004

134 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b9564f7e976ab6f15b477575cc1ca3de5ac15ced

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In General Decision Sciences

1. Ernst Fehr
2. Klaus M. Schmidt
3. C. Schaik
4. Peter M. Kappeler
5. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
6. Chandra Sekhar Sripada
7. Ananish Chaudhuri
8. Stephan Meier

In Safety Research

1. Ernst Fehr
2. Peter M. Kappeler
3. C. Schaik
4. Klaus M. Schmidt
5. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
6. Stephen Stich
7. Chandra Sekhar Sripada
8. Ananish Chaudhuri

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Peter M. Kappeler
2. C. Schaik
3. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
4. Klaus M. Schmidt
5. Stephen Stich
6. Chandra Sekhar Sripada
7. Ernst Fehr
8. Ananish Chaudhuri

Citations in the corpus

• Cooperation in primates and humans : mechanisms and evolution (2006, background): “…replicated by many researchers (see for example , Bowles et al. 2001, Sefton et al. 2002, Gächter et al. 2003, Masclet et al. 2003, Carpenter 2004, Carpenter et al. 2004, Falk et al. 2004, Gürerk et al. 2004, Anderson & Putterman, in prep., Bochet et al., in prep., Page et al. in prep., Carpenter…”
• Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories (2006, background): “The papers by Charness and Rabin (2002) and by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) show that a substantial percentage of the Allocators in multi person dictator games care for the material payoff of the least well-off group member. The relevance of the maximin motive in these games is, for example, illustr”
• A Framework for the Psychology of Norms (2006, background): “( Brown, 1991 ), gossip and criticism are human universals (Dunbar, 1997; Wilson et al.,”
• The Demand for Punishment (2007, background): “Carpenter et al. (2004a) adjust their protocol so that 116 punishment is costly to the punisher but still imposes no material harm on the target and bring 117 the resulting game to the field.”
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods (2007, background): “…do exist in which punishment is used to elicit positive contributions and, depending on the initial population distribution of strategies, evolutionary models have demonstrated that punishing strategies often survive (Sethi, 1996; Carpenter et al., 2004; Carpenter and people in large groups.”