The Economics of Governance
By O. Williamson. 2005
747 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7a3e8571ddae75a2fbb7fef2ce8ad129b18461e5
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Citations in the corpus
- Competing for Government Procurement Contracts: The Role of Corporate Social Responsibility (2018, neutral): “Incomplete contracts—which are more prevalent for complex projects, such as procurement projects—are prone to strategic behavior (Williamson, 1971, 2005), leading to increased costs of negotiations and renegotiations (Bajari et al., 2014).”
- Buy local, pollute less: What drives households to join a community supported farm? (2009, background): “TCE à la Barzel predicts a discriminating alignment between the main transaction exchange attributes, namely the measurement difficulty, and the governance mode (Williamson, 1985; V er si on p os tp rin t Comment citer ce document : Bougherara, D., Grolleau, G., Mzoughi, N. (2009).”
- Macrosocial Determinants of Population Health (2010, background): “Instead of addressing governance structures and the efficiency imperative (4), the chapter tends toward a politically leftist rant against the alcohol, automotive, firearms, food, pharmaceutical, and tobacco industries.”
- A review of the IT outsourcing empirical literature and future research directions (2010, background): “Among the 17 independent variables in this category, the most frequently examined transaction attributes come directly from TCE (Williamson, 1991, 2005): Uncertainty (26 times), Asset Specificity (21 times), Measurement Difficulty (11 times), and Transaction Costs (11 times) (e.g., Nam et al .,…”
- Cooperative membership and farmers’ choice of marketing channels – Evidence from apple farmers in Shaanxi and Shandong Provinces, China (2018, background): “Williamson (2005) assumes that transaction costs are caused by bounded rationality and opportunism of human behaviours and attributes of a transaction, especially uncertainty, frequency2 and asset specificity (Williamson, 1979).”
- The Co-Evolution of Organizational Value Capture, Value Creation and Sustainable Advantage (2009, neutral): “I @ B 8 - 3 6 8 # 7 F 6”
- 1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control (2007, neutral): “Similarly, our task was facilitated by an extraordinary body of work that provided a broad overview of corporate governance (eg, Corley, 2005 ; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003 ; Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003 ; Davis, 2005 ; Denis, 2001 ; Gaa, 2004 ; Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, in press; H”
- Firm-Specific Human Capital, Organizational Incentives, and Agency Costs: Evidence from Retail Banking (2014, background): “Our setting resembles any contractual arrangement with separation of ownership and control in the presence of asymmetric information (Williamson, 2005).”
- Contracting for Complex Products (2010, background): “Expenditures are asset specific to the extent they have no economic value outside the product being produced (Williamson, 2005).”
- Improving performance and reducing cost in buyer–supplier relationships: The role of justice in curtailing opportunism (2015, background): “Economic ordering is fundamentally based on transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985, 2005), which assumes that parties in an economic transaction pursue self-interest on the basis of calculativeness.”
- Performance Implications of Mismatched Governance Regimes across External and Internal Relationships (2011, background): “Rather, they require some form of a “visible hand” (Smith 1776), or explicit governance efforts to reduce the friction inherent in interactions between self-interested parties (Williamson 2005).”