The Influence of Activism by Institutional Investors on R&D

By Parthiban David, Michael A. Hitt, Javier Gimeno. 2001

494 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/667fac6b7a5ddbe84a380cc54499257e58262237

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Citations in the corpus

Research and Development, Cash Flow, Agency and Governance: UK large companies (2012, background): “The study by David et al (2001) and the meta-study by Garcia-Quevedo (2004) were inconclusive.”
Board Independence and Real Earnings Management: The Case of R&D Expenditure (2008, unknown): “This trade-off between current and future earnings might result in a reduction of managerial commitment to long-term investments and a preference for short-term results (David et al., 2001).”
Diversified Business Groups and Corporate Refocusing in Emerging Economies (2005, background): “David, Hitt, and Gimeno (2001) suggested that institutional shareholders are often vigilant in guarding against opportunistic managerial and other owner behavior that would result in wealth-destroying tunneling.”
Institutional Ownership Differences and International Diversification: The Effects of Boards of Directors and Technological Opportunity (2003, background): “As they have relatively little pressure for immediate returns, pension funds are likely to be interested in the development of innovative capabilities (David et al., 2001; Kochhar & David, 1996).”
Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review (2010, background): “In the past two decades a significant change in corporate governance research has been the extent to which institutional owners are seen as significant monitors of managerial decisions (David et al., 2001; Hoskisson et al., 2002).”
Service Innovativeness and Firm Value (2013, background): “Firms with more innovations have higher systematic risk (e.g., David, Hitt, and Gimeno 2001), but research-and-development spending is negatively linked to systematic risk (McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim 2007).”
Corporate Governance and Innovation: A Survey (2012, unknown): “More recently, David et al. (2001), examining a panel of 73 US firms over the 1987–1993 period, found a positive effect of institutional investors’ activism on”
Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership (2008, background): “Prior research indicates that differences among institutional owners largely reflect their legal types, relationships with the focal firm, investment horizons, and propensity for activism (David, Hitt, and Gimeno, 2001; David, Kochhar, and Levitas, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Woidtke, 2002).”
What Constrains or Facilitates Divestitures of Formerly Acquired Firms? The Effects of Organizational Inertia (2005, background): “…in a firm (i.e., a blockholder defined as owning at least 5% of the firm’s stock), such as institutional investors, have become increasingly important in pressuring top management to make changes deemed critical to firm performance (David et al., 2001; Karpoff, Malatesta, & Walking, 1996).”