Board Independence and Real Earnings Management: The Case of R&D Expenditure

By Beatriz García Osma. 2008

279 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/34b9a5b08780b2e069426cf518fd17c5517c6b36

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Citations in the corpus

Gender diversity and earnings management: the case of female directors with financial background (2021, unknown): “In addition, unlike accruals-based earnings management, real earnings management is related to routine business decisions undertaken throughout the year and arguably outside directors have less information about day-to-day operations (Osma 2008).”
The impact of audit quality on real and accrual earnings management around IPOs (2017, background): “Based on the monitoring role of the board of directors, IPO firms with a higher percentage of outside directors, a larger number of directors on the board, and no Chairman/CEO duality are expected to have a lower level of earnings management (e.g., Klein, 2002; Osma, 2008).”
Family Ownership, Board Independence, and R&D Investment (2009, background): “With human capital, independent directors have sufficient technical knowledge to efficiently detect and constrain myopic R&D reductions (Osma, 2008).”
The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on real and accrual earnings management practices: evidence from Jordan (2019, methodology): “In the REM literature, Kang and Kim (2012) provide evidence that REM decreases as board size increases, whilst Talbi et al. (2015) finds the opposite and others (e.g. Osma, 2008) find no association.”
Corporate environmental disclosure and earnings management—The moderating role of corporate governance structures (2021, background): “In this regard, Osma (2008) suggest that managers might attempt to hide earnings-related information from the board in an effort to compromise the decision of independent directors.”
Is Environmental Governance Substantive or Symbolic? An Empirical Investigation (2012, background): “Part of the governance monitoring function includes the oversight of investments by the board owing to directors’ economic responsibilities (Osma 2008).”
Board gender diversity and dividend policy in Australian listed firms: the effect of ownership concentration (2019, unknown): “…versus non-executive women directors The monitoring propensity of a board is a function of the board’s independence (Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009; Osma, 2008; Chen, Cheng, & Wang, 2015), which can be measured as the proportion of nonexecutive directors on the board (Adams & Ferreira, 2009;…”