Multiple Messages to Retain Retailers: Signaling New Product Demand

By Preyas S. Desai. 2000

181 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6400e2c0bd1d50048f2f3158d3f7a965e8da6a02

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Information Systems

1. J. Miguel Villas-Boas
2. Kannan Srinivasan
3. Jingqi Wang
4. Hyoduk Shin
5. Baojun Jiang
6. Kinshuk Jerath
7. Xiaomeng Guo

In Marketing

1. Baohong Sun
2. J. Miguel Villas-Boas
3. Kannan Srinivasan
4. Jingqi Wang
5. Shibo Li
6. Hyoduk Shin
7. Baojun Jiang
8. Kinshuk Jerath

In Strategy and Management

1. Baohong Sun
2. J. Miguel Villas-Boas
3. Kannan Srinivasan
4. Jingqi Wang
5. Shibo Li
6. Hyoduk Shin
7. Baojun Jiang
8. Kinshuk Jerath

Citations in the corpus

• The Impact of Contracts and Competition on Upstream Innovation in a Supply Chain (2015, background): “The man-ufacturer also has a unit manufacturing cost c M , and a reservation profit (Bernstein and Marx 2010, Desai 2000, Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997), which we denote as R M .”
• Internet Auction Features as Quality Signals. (2009, background): “Thus, it is more costly for lowquality sellers to adopt this tool (Desai 2000; Kalra and Li 2008; Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995), and consumers can rely on this indicator to separate high-quality from lowquality products.”
• Signaling through Price and Quality to Consumers with Fairness Concerns (2016, background): “26 Desai PS (2000) Multiple messages to retain retailers: Signaling new product demand. Marketing Science 19(4):381-389. Desai PS, Srinivasan K (1995) Demand signaling under unobservable effort in franchising: Linear and non-linear price contracts. Management Science 41(10):1608-1623. Fehr E, Schmid”
• Consumer Learning, Brand Loyalty, and Competition (2004, background): “Other possible important dimensions not explored here are that there may be some common effects across consumers on how they value different brands, and some possible private information of the firms regarding these common effects, which may lead to signaling activities (see, for example, Moorthy an”
• Firm Strategies in the "Mid Tail" of Platform-Based Retailing (2011, background): “First, in most signaling games, a separating equilibrium in which a high-type player separates from a low-type player is the focal equilibrium (e.g., Desai 2000, Desai and 10   Srinivasan 1995, Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995, Shin 2005, Simester 1995, Soberman 2003).”