Stakeholder Rights and Corporate Governance: A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers

By William D. Schneper, Mauro F. Guillén. 2004

240 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/62904ef0bc8daca2d4ca706984eb675c1d34f79f

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Citations in the corpus

Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms (2010, methodology): “More broadly, our study joins the recent work of Heugens et al. (2009), La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2002), Peng et al. (2008, 2009), Roe (2002), Schneper and Guillen (2004), Young et al. (2008), and others in sketching the contours of a cross-country, institution-based view of corporate governance.”
Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance (2008, background): “from labor, creditors, and regulatory agencies (Schneper and Guillén, 2004).”
Institutions and the internationalization of US venture capital firms (2010, unknown): “…constitute a separate category because their legal systems, though in many cases influenced by either French or German law, have been in flux since 1989 and have largely failed to provide a sound basis for effective corporate governance (Schneper & Guillen, 2004; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000).”
Family Firm Reputation and Humanization: Consumers and the Trust Advantage of Family Firms Under Different Conditions of Brand Familiarity (2018, background): “That is important, as stakeholder theory finds that stakeholders differ greatly in their expectations and interests (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Schneper & Guillén, 2004).”
Slack resources, firm performance, and the institutional context: Evidence from privately held European firms (2017, background): “Moreover, these two groups have been extensively studied (Botero et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 1997), especially in the strategy literature (Capron and Guillén, 2009; Schneper and Guillén, 2004).”
Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “…the different stakeholders in the firm (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & de Colle, 2010; Jones, 1995; Schneper & Guillen, 2004), a point that is also discussed in the corporate social responsibility literature (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi,…”
How Firms Shape Income Inequality: Stakeholder Power, Executive Decision Making, and the Structuring of Employment Relationships (2015, background): “For example, whether a country's system of corporate governance favors minority versus majority shareholders influences the types of investors that take equity stakes in firms (Coffee, 2001) as well as how active the takeover market is in a country (Schneper & Guillen, 2004).”
Equity Crowdfunding and Governance: Toward an Integrative Model and Research Agenda (2019, unknown): “A final reason is that while there is always the possibility of a (hostile) takeover risk for public firms with dispersed ownership, so that management can be replaced (Schneper and Guillén, 2004), entrepreneurs in ECF firms generally retain a significant ownership percentage, which”
Principal-principal conflicts during crisis (2011, unknown): “La Porta et al.'s (1998) index has been widely used in cross-country studies (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Peng & Jiang, 2010; Schneper & Guillen, 2004).”
Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? (2011, methodology): “Extending Carney et al. (2009, 2011), Davis (2005), La Porta et al. (2002), Liu et al. (2011), Peng and Jiang (2010), Roe (2002), Schneper and Guillen (2004) , and Young et al. (2008), our Study 2 helps delineate a cross-country, institution-based theory of corporate governance.”
Social Movements as Extra-Institutional Entrepreneurs: The Effect of Protests on Stock Price Returns (2007, background): “Although there has been much discussion of a stakeholder theory of the firm (e.g., Donaldson and Preston, 1995), we know very little about how secondary stakeholders, like activist groups, affect organizational policymaking (although see Baron, 2001, 2003; Schneper and Guillén, 2004).”
Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review and Future Directions (2009, unknown): “Schneper and Guillen (2004) investigated the spread of hostile takeovers in 37 countries and showed that the extent of shareholder right protection and the extent to which workers’ and banks’ rights are protected affect the frequency of hostile takeovers.”