Corporate control, bank risk taking, and the health of the banking industry☆

By Ronald C. Anderson, D. Fraser. 2000

371 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4e1c77b3a155705779746f42544de8f77ee86f5b

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Citations in the corpus

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, positive): “Similar findings are reported by Saunders et al. (1990), Anderson and Fraser (2000), Pathan (2009), Demsetz et al. (1997), and Pi and Timme (1993).”
Loan Loss Provisions, Earnings Management and Capital Management under IFRS: The Case of EU Commercial Banks (2011, background): “Bank capital provides confidence to depositors and creditors which in turn determine the security of the bank and the stability of the financial system in total ( Anderson and Fraser 2000 ).”
Risk-taking behaviour and ownership in the banking industry: The Spanish evidence (2008, background): “Saunders et al. (1990), Chen et al. (1998), Gorton and Rosen (1995) or Anderson and Fraser (2000) analyse the link between managerial ownership and risk-taking.”
Committee Independence and Financial Institution Performance During the 2007–08 Credit Crunch: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study (2011, background): “Anderson and Fraser (2000) suggest that inside directors’ preference for risk may be substantially different from that of independent directors, while Deutsch et al. (2007) suggest that due to different attitudes toward risk, a potential conflict in goals exists between shareholders and outside dire”
Factors affecting bank risk taking: Evidence from Japan (2004, methodology): “For example, in 1998, the average managerial holdings in our sample was only 0.24%, while in the US, the average managerial holdings was about 10% during the 1987–1994 period (Anderson and Fraser, 2000).”
Endogenously Structured Boards of Directors in Banks (2010, methodology): “63% reported by Anderson and Fraser (2000). The mean (median) NBLOCKOWN is 3.67% (7.24%), which is lower than that of 6.64%, as reported by Anderson and Fraser (2000). For brevity, the descriptive statistics of ownership and bank-specific variables (in Panels C and D of Table 2) are not described fu”
How accounting and auditing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safety-nets in banking: Some international evidence (2005, background): “(1999), and Anderson and Fraser (2000) also confirm the negative influence of bank charter value on risk-taking behavior in the United States in the 1980s”
Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of bank risk (2005, methodology): “Galloway et al. (1997), Cebenoyan et al. (1999), and Anderson and Fraser (2000) also confirm the negative influence of bank charter value on risk-taking behaviour in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s.”
The Impact of Credit Risk Management on Financial Performance of Commercial Banks in Kenya (2013, background): “(1990) and Anderson and Fraser (2000) analyse the case of US, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) and Marco and Fernandez (2008) present comparable studies for the cases of Japan and Spanish, respectively. Their studies add value to an existing gap in the literature with respect to risk measurements. Whereas ”
Ownership Structure and Risk in Publicly Held and Privately Owned Banks (2011, result): “If some studies find a negative relationship, others obtain U-shaped relationships (or inverse U-shaped) between ownership concentration and risk (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Chen, et al., 1998; Anderson and Fraser, 2000).”
The influence of CEO demographic characteristics on corporate risk-taking: evidence from Chinese IPOs (2016, background): “Prior studies have used different proxies for risk-taking including R&D intensity, innovation, and acquisitions and takeovers.4 However following Anderson and Fraser (2000), Pathan (2009) and Low (2009), we estimate three different measures of corporate risk-taking namely total risk,…”