Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of bank risk
By F. González. 2005
347 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0346e0c31af78c7beb6779cd9402fcce09d86341
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Sailesh Tanna
- Fotios Pasiouras
- J. Klomp
- Jakob de Haan
- Amine Tarazi
- Constantin Zopounidis
- Phil Molyneux
- Pejman Abedifar
In Finance
- Fotios Pasiouras
- Sailesh Tanna
- J. Klomp
- Jakob de Haan
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Amine Tarazi
- Constantin Zopounidis
- Phil Molyneux
Citations in the corpus
- Competition and risk in South East Asian commercial banking (2012, methodology): “…1995; De Bandt and Davis, 2000; De Nicolo, 2000; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Claessens and Leaven, 2004; Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2004; Gelos and Roldos, 2004; Gonzalez, 2005; Beck et al., 2006; Casu and Girardone, 2006; Wagner, 2007; Altunbas et al., 2007; Carbo et al., 2009; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009).”
- Corporate Risk Taking and Ownership Structure (2010, background): “Gonzalez (2005) finds that deposit insurance and the quality of the contracting environment increase risk-taking by reducing bank charter value.”
- The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis (2006, background): “Since lower values of OENV indicate lower corruption, government bureaucracy, better quality and enforcement of the legal system, the assessment of Fitch appears to be consistent with the empirical results of Barth et al. (2004a), Gonzalez (2005) and Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005).”
- Corruption and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies (2015, positive): “2.4 Regulation There is rich evidence that bank regulation policies are important determinants for banks’ risk-taking behavior (Laeven and Levin, 2009; Barth et al., 2004, 2008; Gonzalez, 2005).”
- Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power-Risk Nexus (2013, neutral): “Second, while there is a large set of studies looking at the determinants of risks in banking (De Nicolò 2001, González 2005, Nier and Baumann 2003), but only a few papers address the impact of the internationalization of banks.”
- Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence (2014, background): “…bank risk-taking is extensive and, to our knowledge, exists for US banks (Keeley, 1990; Galloway et al., 1997; among others), Japanese banks (Konishi and Yasuda, 2004), a sample of EU banks (Gropp and Vesala, 2004), and for a sample of more than 30 countries (González, 2005; Berger et al., 2009).”
- International evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ technical efficiency: an application of two-stage data envelopment analysis (2007, positive): “For instance, De Nicolo (2000) finds that banks operating in countries with a higher level of banks’ state ownership exhibit lower charter values and higher insolvency risk, while Caprio and Martinez (2000) show that government ownership is significantly associated with increases in bank fragility”
- A comprehensive analysis of the effects of risk measures on bank efficiency: Evidence from emerging Asian countries (2011, background): “González (2005) analyzes the impact of bank regulation on bank”
- Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all? (2012, positive): “Fernandez and González (2005) and Barth et al. (2004) conclude that regulations that encourage and facilitate private monitoring of banks increase financial soundness, as they lower moral hazard created by information asymmetries.”
- The impact of banking regulations on banks' cost and profit efficiency: Cross-country evidence (2009, methodology): “…data across a number of years have followed a similar approach (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirguck-Kunt et al., 2004; Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005). and Rogers (1998) among others, we observe that the most cost efficient banks are not necessarily the most profit efficient and vice…”