Loan Loss Provisions, Earnings Management and Capital Management under IFRS: The Case of EU Commercial Banks

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The Interaction of the IFRS 9 Expected Loss Approach with Supervisory Rules and Implications for Financial Stability (2016, unknown): “the EU has indeed led to a significant decrease in income smoothing (Gebhardt and NovotnyFarkas, 2011; Leventis et al., 2011).”
Corporate social responsibility and earnings management in U.S. banks (2014, methodology): “Third, they are the most commonly used means of estimating EM in anking-specific studies (Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, & Lobo, 2010; Leventis et al., 2011).”
Bank Income Smoothing, Ownership Concentration and the Regulatory Environment (2014, background): “…banks having a relatively high level of commission and fee income might allocate additional loan loss provisions to signal that they are safe even if they provide multiple services (Anandarajan et al. 2007, Leventis et al. 2011); we thus expect a positive coeffi cient for the variable COMi,j,t.”
Earnings and capital management and signaling: the use of loan-loss provisions by European banks (2015, methodology): “…and Thomas (1999), Hasan and Wall (2004),Anandarajan, Hasan, and McCarthy (2007), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), Fonseca and Gonzàles (2008), and Leventis, Dimitropoulos, and Anandarajan (2011) – in order to test for the income smoothing hypothesis, we consider the variable EBTPi,t , which is…”