How accounting and auditing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safety-nets in banking: Some international evidence

By A. Fernández, F. González. 2005

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f85622347c9ee630880ac5de1f379810b72c664d

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Citations in the corpus

The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis (2006, background): “More specifically, as Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) mention, bank authorities have set up a range of devices in an attempt to control risk-taking incentives induced by safety nets.”
Bank supervision, regulation, and efficiency: evidence from the European Union (2012, result): “Using the same time span as in the above study and a sample of stock exchange-listed banks, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) provide evidence to suggest that in countries with low accounting and auditing requirements more power on official supervisory authorities may reduce risk-taking behaviour from…”
Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all? (2012, unknown): “Fernandez and González (2005) and Barth et al. (2004) conclude that regulations that encourage and facilitate private monitoring of banks increase financial soundness, as they lower moral hazard created by information asymmetries.”
Supervisory Effectiveness and Bank Risk (2011, methodology): “Initial capital stringency refers to whether the sources of funds counted as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities and 7 This approach has been also followed by Fernández and González (2005) and Pasiouras et al. (2006), among others.”
Bank Regulation, the Quality of Institutions, and Banking Risk in Emerging and Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis (2014, background): “Countries lacking a sound legal system and good governance might have weaker banks due to corruption or inefficient enforcement of law and government ineffectiveness (La Porta et al., 1998; Levine, 1998; Barth et al., 2004a; Fernandez and González, 2005).”
The impact of banking regulations on banks' cost and profit efficiency: Cross-country evidence (2009, methodology): “13 For the construction of the capital requirements (CAPITRQ), power of supervisory agencies (OFFPR) and market discipline (MDISC) indices, we use the summation of the 0/1 quantified answers as in Barth et al. (2001b), Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), Pasiouras et al. (2006) and Pasiouras (2008).”
International evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ technical efficiency: an application of two-stage data envelopment analysis (2007, unknown): “In contrast, after controlling for accounting and auditing requirements, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) report that in countries with low accounting and auditing requirements a more stringent disciplinary capacity of supervisors over management action appears to be useful in risk reduction.”
Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, and Banks' Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets (2010, background): “…Chapman University, wihlborg@chapman.edu Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/business_articles Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Economic Theory Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Insurance Commons, and the Other Business Commons”
The Impact of Educational Levels on Formal and Informal Entrepreneurship (2015, background): “The scores fluctuate etween 0 and 100 (Fernández and González, 2005).”