Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?

By Nikos Nikiforakis. 2008

672 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ca42addb2560197c01638da1cacfe978d9664cf6

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Citations in the corpus

Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “21Nikiforakis (2010) reports that the efficacy of punishments also depends on the nature of the feedback provided to participants.”
The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, background): “Our results show that it does not take 'counterpunishment' (i.e., multiple rounds of retaliatory punishment for having got punished) to limit successful self-governance (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008).”
Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement (2012, background): “19 the threat posed by counter-punishment increases (e.g., Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011), the similar levels of investment in first-stage punishment in the Asymmetric and Symmetric treatments, despite the greater risk of reprisal in the Asymmetric t”
Voting on Punishment Systems Within a Heterogeneous Group (2011, background): “Nikiforakis (2008), “Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?””
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations (2010, background): “Such “counter-punishment” on the individual level is documented and analysed in Denant-Boemont, Masclet and Noussair (2007) and Nikiforakis (2008), for instance.”
Global Evidence on Economic Preferences* (2018, neutral): “Second, motivated by research at the individual level on how punishment can trigger conflict in the form of vengeful counter-punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008), the analysis correlates average negative reciprocity of a country’s population with the log of the frequency of armed co”
Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty (2010, background): “Other studies providing a more ambiguous picture of punishment behavior are Miller (1999), Nikiforakis (2008), and Abbink and Herrmann (2009).”
The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “…show that defectors may retaliate when punished in repeated games (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Denant- Boemont et al., 2007; Dreber et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Wu et al., 2009), that defectors may punish cooperators even in the absence of the possibility for retaliation (either in one-shot…”
The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment (2006, background): “Nikiforakis (2008) studies punishment in a public good game in which retaliation was possible, but in which the punishment phase ends automatically after retaliation.”