VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS

By Stephan Kroll, Todd L. Cherry, Jason F. Shogren. 2007

134 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/498133f76219ac5eb7195aea78865bce76a07c93

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Simon Gächter
2. Martin G. Kocher
3. Matthias Sutter
4. Benedikt Herrmann
5. Charles N. Noussair
6. Fangfang Tan
7. Akira Okada
8. Arno Riedl

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Michael Kosfeld
2. Matthias Sutter
3. Martin G. Kocher
4. Charles N. Noussair
5. Jason F. Shogren
6. Akira Okada
7. Simon Gächter
8. Arno Riedl

In Safety Research

1. Matthias Sutter
2. Martin G. Kocher
3. Benedikt Herrmann
4. Simon Gächter
5. Arno Riedl
6. Charles N. Noussair
7. Michael Kosfeld
8. Jason F. Shogren

Citations in the corpus

• Voting on Punishment Systems Within a Heterogeneous Group (2011, background): “In Kroll et al. (2007), agents first play a voluntary contributions game for ten periods, and make and vote on non-binding proposals of minimum total contributions. They report that voting is an empty commitment unless punishment is used to enforce the outcome. Kosfeld et al. (2008) have a similar f”
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations (2010, background): “A further difference is that Decker et al. (2003) do not let groups choose whether they want to have a punishment option or not, while Kroll et al. (2007) and Guillen et al. (2006) allow groups to vote on punishment options.”
• The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, background): “cooperation. See for instance Fehr and Gachter (2000), Fehr and Gachter (2002); Masclet, et al. (2003); Egas and Riedl (2006); Noussair and Tucker (2005); Page, et al. (2005); Bochet, et al. (2006); Bowles, et al. (2006); Gurerk, et al. (2006); Sutter, et al. (2006); Botelho, et al. (2007); Carpente”
• On Behavioral-Environmental Economics (2008, background): “For example, Kroll, Cherry, and Shogren (2007) created a nonbinding voting public goods game with and without punishment.”
• Institution formation in public goods games (2006, background): “…some extent, for endogenous institutional choice (Walker et al. Ostrom 2000; Özgür Gürerk, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Bettina Rockenbach 2006; Matthias Sutter, Stefan Haigner, and Martin G. Kocher 2006; Jean-Robert Tyran and Lars P. Feld 2006; Stephan Kroll, Todd L. Cherry, and Jason F. Shogren 2007).”