The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia

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Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “Rabin (1993), building on the pioneering work of Geanakoplos et al. (1989) develops the concept of “fairness equilibrium” which explicitly incorporates the beliefs that players hold about others’ actions.”
Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment (2017, background): “While the punishment of freeriders is aimed at increasing cooperation, antisocial punishment can be a form of retaliation for punishment received in repeated games [32, 41], or is simply aimed at cooperators without a retaliatory motive [36, 37].”
Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopia (2015, background): “In these findings the incentives for conditional cooperators (i.e., group members who cooperate voluntarily given that others cooperate as well) has been shown to play an important role (Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Gächter and Thöni 2005, 2011).”