The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment
By Astrid Hopfensitz, Ernesto Reuben. 2006
249 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d4ba4b69268f2fe131267e60931ffd491354db48
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Charles N. Noussair
- Ernesto Reuben
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- Julien Étienne
- Astrid Hopfensitz
- Arno Riedl
- Tom Wilkening
- Frans van Winden
In Safety Research
- Ernesto Reuben
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- Charles N. Noussair
- P. V. van Lange
- Daniel Balliet
- Arno Riedl
- Astrid Hopfensitz
- Tom Wilkening
In Sociology and Political Science
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- Ernesto Reuben
- Charles N. Noussair
- Daniel Balliet
- Astrid Hopfensitz
- P. V. van Lange
- Julien Étienne
- Arno Riedl
Citations in the corpus
- Compliance Theory: A Goal Framing Approach (2011, background): “For instance, it has been shown that normative conformity is reinforced by (hedonic) feelings of guilt and shame in case of nonconformity by self or feelings of anger in case of nonconformity by others (e.g., Hopfensitz and Reuben 2009; Elster 1998; Makkai and Braithwaite 1994b).”
- Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups (2007, background): “For instance, Hopfensitz and Reuben (2007) and Reuben and van Winden (2007) find that sanctions enforce cooperative behavior only if people feel they have transgressed a social norm, and hence, deserve punishment (see also Bowles and Gintis 2005).”
- Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis. (2011, background): “Social incentives can also evoke costly retaliation (Denant-Boemont, Masclet, & Noussair, 2007; Hopfensitz & Rueben, 2009; Oliver, 1980), transform an ethical decision into a business decision (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999), and even undermine trust in others (Chen,…”
- Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations (2009, unknown): “the punishment received in the previous period, ∑ j 6=i pjikt−1, to control for punishment that might be motivated by revenge (Denant-Boemont et al. 2007; Nikiforakis 2008; Hopfensitz and Reuben 2009).”
- Honest signaling in trust interactions: smiles rated as genuine induce trust and signal higher earning opportunities (2015, methodology): “We use a simplified version of the original trust game, proposing senders a binary choice of trust or no trust and trustees three different return options (see Hopfensitz & Reuben, 2009).”
- Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study (2012, unknown): “This is consistent with the findings of Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009) in that punishment facilitates future cooperation, but only when it evokes shame and guilt, not when it evokes anger.”
- Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement (2012, background): “6 Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009) study a variant of the trust game and allow subjects to engage in sequences of retaliatory punishment.”
- Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect (2008, background): “For instance, Hopfensitz and Reuben (2005) study a game in which some subjects have precisely this opportunity.”