Introduction to industrial organization

By Luís M. B. Cabral. 2000

439 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

The Market Value of R&D, Patents and Trademarks (2011, unknown): “Brands provide incentives for firms to offer products of a consistent and reliable quality (Cabral, 2000b; Economides, 1988; Landes and Posner, 1987).”
Intangible Assets, Information Complexity, and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts (2005, background): “…also finds that, due to the public goods nature of advertising, advertising spending by the firm may strengthen the brands of its competitors (Cabral, 2000), and truthful advertising by the firm can be rendered implausible and useless when advertising by others is deemed false (Hansen and…”
Do non‐competition agreements lead firms to pursue risky R&D projects? (2014, background): “Consider, for example, a pharmaceutical firm that performed research in the antidepressant market in the early 1990s (see Cabral, 2000).”
Consumer Preferences and Product-Line Pricing Strategies: An Empirical Analysis (2006, background): “Cabral (2000) suggests that price discrimination is present if the ratio of prices is different from the ratio of marginal costs.”
Competitive Reactions to Advertising and Promotion Attacks (2005, background): “As a result, we would expect higher advertising intensity in categories where the advertising elasticity of demand is greater (Cabral 2000).”
Competitiveness and R&D competition revisited (2013, background): “See also Mateus and Moreira (2007), Cabral (2000), and works cited in these books.”
Cooperation in International Banking Supervision (2004, unknown): “The relevant discount rate will depend on a number of factors including how frequently the supervisors interact (see, e.g. Cabral, 2000).”
The cartel of good intentions: The problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid (2002, background): “…in favor of items that are more observable to those outside the aid agencies.36 The cartel can threaten with public embarrassment any agency tempted to shift 33This section draws upon the textbook treatment of conditions favoring collusion in Cabral, 2000; Church and Ware, 2000; and Martin, 2002.”