The cartel of good intentions: The problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid

By William R. Easterly. 2002

459 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3bc915bc6d4880e7fbcfd225cfafd184a5cbd3d6

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In Development

1. V. Gauri
2. Thai‐Ha Le
3. Minsoo Lee
4. Jungsuk Kim
5. Anna Fruttero

In Information Systems

1. V. Gauri
2. Thai‐Ha Le
3. Minsoo Lee
4. Jungsuk Kim
5. Anna Fruttero

In Sociology and Political Science

1. V. Gauri
2. Thai‐Ha Le
3. Minsoo Lee
4. Jungsuk Kim
5. Anna Fruttero

Citations in the corpus

• Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action (2017, unknown): “2009), “good intentions” versus real results (Easterly 2002), “multi-agent leadership” (Andrews et al.”
• Foreign Aid and Market-Liberalizing Reform (2005, unknown): “Second, most donors do not place the same emphasis on quality of policies and institutions as the IDA allocation system, and even IDA allocations were not well targeted toward recipients with better policies for most of the 1980-2000 period (Easterly, 2002; Dollar and Levin, 2004).”
• Foreign Aid and Inclusive Development: Updated Evidence from Africa, 2005-2012 (2017, unknown): “…2008); novel initiatives at the global level (Radelet & Levine, 2008); ‘aid vouchers’ to provide incentives for better/competitive service delivery by agencies of aid (Easterly, 2002, 2008) and a broad range of measures for more inclusive policies on foreign land acquisition (Osabuohien, 2015).”
• Reinventing Foreign Aid for Inclusive and Sustainable Development: Kuznets, Piketty and the Great Policy Reversal (2016, unknown): “…Kremer, 2008) 21 ; new global initiatives (Radelet & Levine, 2008) 22 ; ‘aid vouchers’ to the poor in order to promote competition in effective service delivery among aid agencies (Easterly, 2002, 2008) and; more emphasis on ‘searching for solutions’ than ‘planning for solutions’ (Easterly, 2006).”
• The Strategic Choices of NGOs: Location Decisions in Rural Bangladesh1 (2005, background): “Easterly [2002] argues for the existence of this ‘blame sharing effect’ in the work and choices of aid agencies.”
• Institutional Quality, Trade Openness, and Financial Sector Development in Asia: An Empirical Investigation (2016, result): “Many studies in related literature also used the same approach to obtain a single, broader index (e.g., Easterly 2002; Al-Marhubi 2004; Bjornksov 2006).”
• The institutional economics of foreign aid (2006, unknown): “Easterly (2003) notes that authors of these reports are frequently unaware of recent studies on the same topic in the same country funded by different donors.”
• The curse of aid (2008, unknown): “Easterly (2003a) points out that the findings in Burnside and Dollar (2000) are also sensitive tothedefinitionofforeignaid,policiesandoutputpercapita. Easterly(2003b,2006) makesa broader argument on why aid frequently fails.”