Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions

By Eric Maskin, John G. Riley. 2000

526 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/37926235fcf1b962b71b520cbdb86d581d18c98c

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Citations in the corpus

Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks (2008, background): “Athey and Bagwell (2004) characterize the static equilibrium for asymmetric rms for Model 1, while the static equilibrium for Model 2 is characterized by Maskin and Riley (2000).”
Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values (2003, background): “Though our results can be easily generalized to a larger number of types, for simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of bidders as in Maskin and Riley (2000a).”
Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First‐Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions (2009, background): “Maskin and Riley (1984) consider a more general model where the utility of winning is of the form u(−bi, vi) and the utility of loosing is equal to w(·).”
An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions (2003, result): “If the distribution of private costs of a ‘weak’ bidder stochastically dominates the distribution of private costs of a ‘strong’ bidder, Maskin and Riley showed (in their Proposition 3.3) that the equilibrium bid distribution should also exhibit stochastic dominance. Evidence of strength in our case”
A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions (2000, background): “This restriction is without loss of generality since costs are independently distributed across contracts.7 Maskin and Riley (1992) establish the existence of equilibria in asymmetric auctions.”
Deciding Between Competition and Collusion (2003, background): “Some of the data fields for projects owned by city and county governments were not complete.”
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions (2004, background): “Recent work on the question of equilibrium existence in …rst-price auctions can be found in Athey (2001), Bresky (1999), Jackson and Swinkels (2003), Lebrun (1996, 1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2000), Maskin and Riley (2000) , and Reny (1999).2 But there appears to be a common di¢culty.”
Identification and Estimation in Highway Procurement Auctions Under Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity (2004, unknown): “Maskin and Riley (2000) show that under these assumptions there is a unique vector of equilibrium strategies, β y = {β y1 , ..., β ym }, which satisfy the following boundary condition: for all i β yi (x) = x, and there exists d yi ∈ [x, x] such that β yi (x) = d yi .”
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions (2011, background): “The first-order conditions, together with the boundary condition defined below, uniquely characterize optimal bidding strategies (Maskin and Riley (2000)).”
Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of incomplete information (2002, methodology): “Jackson and Swinkels (1999)and Simon and Zame (1999) provide more extensive elaborations on the sametheme, extending some results of LeBrun (1995, 1999) and Maskin and Riley(2000).”
Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders* (2011, unknown): “In particular, existence and uniqueness follow from Maskin and Riley (2000b, 2003) among others.”
Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information (2001, unknown): “…studies (Maskin and Riley (1993, 1996); Lebrun (1995, 1996), Bajari (1996a)) have analyzed independent private values auctions, as well as affiliated private values auctions and common value auctions with conditionally independent signals about the object's value (Maskin and Riley (1993, 1996).”
Asymmetric Auctions with Resale (2008, unknown): “Maskin and Riley (2000) derive the most comprehensive characterization and revenue ranking results concerning rst- and second-price auctions in the presence of asymmetries.”
Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders (2006, unknown): “Maskin and Riley (2000) show why different standard auctions cannot be optimal in the presence of bidder asymmetry, but they do not analyze the optimal selling procedure itself and how it depends on the bidding environment (how asymmetric the bidders are, how the optimal selling procedure and the…”