Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

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Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information (2013, methodology): “For example, in the Bertrand game studied by Athey and Bagwell (2008) (and considered in Section 2), this actually yields a tight lower bound on the set of individually rational payoffs.”
Relational Incentive Contracts (2003, background): “The formal structure of cooperation in repeated partnerships is related to that of collusion in repeated oligopoly, of which there are recent models in Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) and Athey and Bagwell (2008). The former makes the relationship explicit in an application of its result that collusio”
Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Empirical Work* (2012, unknown): “Notable exceptions are Athey and Bagwell, 2008, and Cole and Kochelakota (2001).”
The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps (2013, background): “For example, see Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2005) in the context of a monetary policy game and Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004), Athey and Bagwell (2008), and McAfee and McMillan (1992) in the context of collusion.”