Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of incomplete information

By Matthew O. Jackson, Leo Simon, Jeroen M. Swinkels, William R. Zame. 2002

164 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6a009864a94b73a6e7ab2bdaa13790613f5a4d5c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Shmuel Zamir
2. Philip J. Reny

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Shmuel Zamir
2. Philip J. Reny
3. Claudio Mezzetti

Citations in the corpus

• Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions (2007, unknown): “The only di¤erence with analogous arguments made for single object private value auctions (e.g. Maskin and Riley, 2000, and Jackson et al., 2002) is that, here, changing the bid on one object not only changes the probability of winning that object but also changes the probability of winning other…”
• On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions (2004, background): “Applying Jackson et al. (2002) in our setting yields the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium with an endogenous tie-breaking rule.”