Identification and Estimation in Highway Procurement Auctions Under Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity

By Elena Krasnokutskaya. 2004

121 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Science Applications, Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/181a6865409acb7ffa83932343c2daf12a52081c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Computer Science Applications

1. S. Houghton
2. S. Tadelis
3. J. Marion
4. Ricard Gil
5. Patrick Bajari
6. John Asker

In Management Information Systems

1. S. Houghton
2. S. Tadelis
3. John Asker
4. J. Marion
5. Ricard Gil
6. Patrick Bajari
7. John Geweke
8. Hiroshi Ohashi

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. S. Houghton
2. Patrick Bajari
3. S. Tadelis
4. John Asker
5. J. Marion
6. Ricard Gil
7. Caroline Flammer
8. O. Williamson

Citations in the corpus

• Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement (2013, background): “In particular, Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2006) consider the role of incomplete contracts and ex post adjustments, and Krasnokutskaya (2003) estimates a structural auction model in the presence of unobserved cost heterogeneity. Other papers examine the effect of preferential programs in these auc”
• Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence (2011, unknown): “…on analysis of bidding for highway contracts (see Porter and Zona (1993), Hong and Shum (2002), Bajari and Ye (2003), Jofre-Benet and Pesendorfer (2003), Krasnokutskaya (2004),Li and Zheng (2006), Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge and Kosmopoulou (2008), Einav and Esponda (2008) and Gil and Marion (2009)).”
• A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel (2010, methodology): “…for using a deconvolution technique based on the estimation of empirical characteristic functions !rst proposed by Tong Li and Quang Vuong (1998), in the context of a classical measurement error problem, and applied to the auction setting by Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Krasnokutskaya (2004).”
• Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis (2006, methodology): “However, the strategies proposed in the literature for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. Krasnokutskaya(2004)) are not straightforward to apply to our more complicated framework.”
• Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs (2014, methodology): “Market 3Other researchers that have studied bidding for highway contracts include Porter and Zona (1993), Hong and Shum (2002), Krasnokutskaya (2004), Bajari and Ye (2003), Pesendorfer and Jofre-Bonet (2003) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2004).”