Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders

125 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Do Auctions Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market (2008, background): “(See also Klemperer, 1998; and Povel and Singh, 2006 .) In their model, the presence of a strong bidder would heighten the possibility of a winner’s curse for other possible bidders and would scuttle any gains from conducting an auction.”
Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers (2012, background): “These commitments theoretically lead to more aggressive bidding by acquirers (Hotchkiss, Qian, and Song, 2005; Povel and Singh, 2006) and hence greater bargaining power for targets.”
The Pre-Deal Phase of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda (2020, background): “Target firms can invite additional bidders to participate in the M&A process, order negotiations with multiple interested bidders sequentially (Povel & Singh, 2006), or simply propose to the shareholders the rejection of inadequate bids (Bates & Becher, 2017).”
Shared Auditors in Mergers and Acquisitions (2016, unknown): “These results are consistent with findings in Fishman (1989) and Povel and Singh (2006) and are in support of our thesis that shared auditors may reduce transaction uncertainty as well as reduce competition among bidders to acquirer the target.2 We also find that premiums paid by acquirers in…”