Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders*
By S. Campo, E. Guerre, I. Perrigne, Q. Vuong. 2011
177 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f127ec2905300c9e9ecd924e3a8ecab10daf45a3
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
In Marketing
Citations in the corpus
- Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs (2014, background): “…draws from the growing literature on structural estimation of auction models (See, e.g., Paarsch (1992), Donald and Paarsch (1993), Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), Campo et al. (2002), Pesendorfer and Jofre-Bonet (2003), and Athey, Levin and Seira (2004).3 Our analysis o¤ers three contributions.”
- Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First‐Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions (2009, methodology): “Such a restriction avoids the use of a conditional quantile restriction as in Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2007).”
- Risk Aversion at the Country Level (2015, unknown): “1 See Chetty (2006); Campo et al. (2011); Friend and Blume (1975); Gandelman and Hernández-Murillo (2013); Garcia, Lugar, and Renault (2003); Gordon and St-Amour (2004); Hansen and Singleton (1983); Kapteyn and Teppa (2011); Layard, Mayraz, and Nickell (2008); Mankiw (1985); Szpiro (1986); and…”