Competitive price discrimination

By Mark Armstrong, John Vickers. 2001

530 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/377421df5e0e8b888e722281b6e6d95adc40229c

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Citations in the corpus

Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition (2003, methodology): “Armstrong and Vickers (2001), we address this possibility and related issues of consumer surplus and industry profit in the simplest discrete-choice setting in which there is a single market segment with homogeneous consumers.”
The Impact of Competition on Bank Orientation (2007, background): “In multi-product spatial models, firms in need of multiple products may engage a single bank, most likely the closest one, in order to minimize transportation and search costs (Armstrong and Vickers (2001)).”
Quality Segmentation in Spatial Markets: When Does Cannibalization Affect Product Line Design? (2001, background): “This is in contrast to Armstrong and Vickers (1999) and Rochet and Stole (1999), who assume that both segments have the same strength of taste preferences and find that the price-cost margins are the same for all items in the product line in the efficient solution.”
Price Discrimination and Competition (2007, methodology): “Several papers have taken this approach in one form or another, including Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (1999), Verboven (1999), Armstrong and Vickers (2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002).”
The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets (2012, result): “Second, it is consistent with the predictions of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) who find cost-based two-part tariffs characterize the equilibria in some settings analyzing competition among price-discriminating firms.”
Consumer Inattention and Bill-Shock Regulation (2015, result): “The knife-edge efficiency-result in Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 is analogous to findings by Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) in a static rather than sequential screening context.”
Competitive Non-linear Pricing and Bundling (2009, background): “For example Spulber (1979), Stole (1995), Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) examine competitive nonlinear pricing in situations in which consumers purchase all products from a single supplier.”
Cellular Service Demand: Biased Beliefs, Learning, and Bill Shock (2015, background): “…with evidence in Miravete (2003) which documents that on average all consumers who chose a small metered plan would have saved money on a larger flat rate plan.8 Second, as in the Kentucky experiment we find that most consumers (55 to 71 percent) initially choose the tariff that turns out to…”
Supplier Surfing: Competition and Consumer Behavior in Subscription Markets (2003, background): “•̂ Other studies involving price discrimination in zero-profit industries include Borenstein (1985), Locay and Rodriguez (1992), and Armstrong and Vickers (2001).”
SUPERMARKET CHOICE AND SUPERMARKET COMPETITION IN MARKET EQUILIBRIUM (2004, background): “(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 100-(1) 100-(3) 100-(5) ASDA 77.”
Network competition in nonlinear pricing (2003, methodology): “(See, for example, Armstrong and Vickers (2001).)”
Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation (2002, methodology): “Armstrong and Vickers (2001) follow up this analysis applying the methodology to competitive models of second- and third-degree price discrimination, which we discuss in more detail in Section 4.”