Consumer Inattention and Bill-Shock Regulation

By Michael Grubb. 2015

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aaa650a86f3e2d55bc9eeaf699528a624dd59b9b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. B. Kőszegi
2. Paul Heidhues
3. Michael Grubb
4. Takeshi Murooka
5. Dennis Philip
6. Kamlesh Kumar
7. C. Engels
8. Michaela Pagel

In Marketing

1. B. Kőszegi
2. Paul Heidhues
3. Takeshi Murooka
4. Michael Grubb
5. Michaela Pagel
6. K. Ericson
7. Andreas Fuster

In Strategy and Management

1. B. Kőszegi
2. Paul Heidhues
3. Takeshi Murooka
4. Dennis Philip
5. Michael Grubb

Citations in the corpus

• Overconfident Consumers in the Marketplace (2015, background): “In either case, consumers overvalue contracts with attention hurdles to firms’ benefit (Grubb, 2015).”
• Inferior Products and Profitable Deception (2017, background): “…charges, such as overdraft protection, for revenue—can be naturally explained by the presence of naive consumers.33 In research complementary to ours, Grubb (2015) considers services (such as cellphone calls or bank-account overdraft protection) for which consumers may not know their marginal…”
• Financial literacy and fraud detection* (2019, background): “…get exploited by firms that shroud high-priced add-ons, such as, in the case of banks, ATM usage fees, bounced check fees, and minimum balance fees; and Grubb (2015), who finds that consumers will benefit from regulation requiring firms to disclose information and alerts that substitute for attention.”