Uncertainty and Incentives
By Canice Prendergast. Journal of Labor Economics, 2002
168 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/36646db22726515e3ba33e189c65223b8878ad00
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Scott Schaefer
- Paul D. Oyer
- Adnan Riaz
- Todd Milbourn
- Kevin J. Murphy
- Shivaram Rajgopal
- Simi Kedia
- Lena Hensvik
In Economics and Econometrics
- Scott Schaefer
- Paul D. Oyer
- Adnan Riaz
- Todd Milbourn
- Michael Waldman
- O. N. Skans
- Lena Hensvik
- G. Garvey
Citations in the corpus
- Job Satisfaction and Motivation of Teachers of Public Educational Institutions (2012, background): “There are proofs that supervisors do not judge the subordinates justifiably and impose personal liking and disliking in the rewards and punishments (Prendergast, 2002).”
- Human Resource Management and Productivity (2010, unknown): “In Prendergast (2002a) risky environments will be ones were the manager‟s private information is more valuable.”
- Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives (2010, background): “Prendergast (2002a) argues that such a pattern might arise if firms delegate more decisionmaking authority to agents — leading to a higher marginal productivity of effort — in exactly those cases where more risk is present.”