Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

By Szilvia Pápai. 2000

429 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3268df542bd83e985c2aab5e30a2794de37ddacc

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Citations in the corpus

School choice: an experimental study (2006, neutral): “[31] Papai, Szilvia.”
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice (2008, methodology): “9 Stable improvement cycles are closely related to Gale’s top-trading cycles, originally introduced in Shapley and Herbert Scarf (97) and later studied in detail by Szilvia Pápai (2000) and Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003).”
A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects (2014, methodology): “In particular, they cover a version of TTC in which priority frameworks take the form of trees (as in Pápai [15]) instead of lists, so that the highest-priority remaining agent for any given object may depend on the objects that were assigned to earlier agents at previous steps.”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, background): “(3)See, for example, Pathak (2006); Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth (2009); Erdil and Ergin (2008); Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2008); Ehlers and Westkamp (2011).”
Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources (2015, positive): “19Previous developments of Gale’s idea—e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999, 2003), Pápai (2000), Ehlers et al. (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2004), and Roth et al. (2004)—required each agent to point to his or her top choice among unmatched houses and hence allowed only top trading cycles.”
Constrained school choice (2009, neutral): “Let (24)Pápai’s (2000) main result implies that τ is group strategy-proof.”
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003, methodology): “Ergin (2000), Szilvia Pápai (2000), James Schummer (2000), Anna Bogomolnaia and Hervé Moulin (2001), Eiichi Miyagawa (2001, 2002), Lars Ehlers (2002), Ehlers et al. (2002) a version of this mechanism has been used in the United States hospital-intern market (Roth and Elliot Peranson, 1997, 1999).”
Pairwise kidney exchange (2005, neutral): “[9], Papai [38], Ehlers [21], Ehlers et al.”
An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (2013, background): “Papai (2000) characterizes hierarchical exchange rules, which top trading cycles is a particular instance of, in terms of Pareto efficiency, group strategy proofness, and reallocation proofness.”
A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution (2002, background): “This Priority mechanism ([1] and [ 9 ] speak of “serial dictatorship”) is efficient and incentive compatible, namely strategyproof.”