Family Business Succession: Appropriation Risk and Choice of Successor

By K. S. Lee, G. Lim, W. Lim. 2003

406 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/317c826045df3cdb7088e436b018a34963741c95

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In Accounting

In Management of Technology and Innovation

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

The role of information asymmetry in the choice of entrepreneurial exit routes (2014, background): “As such our findings are in line with those of other theoretical and empirical studies in the family business literature that address the tendency of incumbent owners to choose internal transfer (e.g., De Massis et al., 2008; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2003).”
Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences (2006, positive): “Lee et al. (2003) apply this same theoretical template to examine succession in family-controlled businesses.”
A Family Member or Professional Management? The Choice of a CEO and its Impact on Performance (2007, neutral): “The choice between a family and professional CEO is a critical issue for the family shareholder (Burkart et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2003).”
CEO Succession Mechanisms, Organizational Context, and Performance: A Socio‐Emotional Wealth Perspective on Family‐Controlled Firms (2014, background): “Maintaining control has been identified as a fundamental goal in family firms (Lee et al., 2003; Schulze et al., 2003), and a central part of their SEW preservation (Berrone et al.”
Resources and Innovation in Family Businesses: The Janus-Face of Socioemotional Preferences (2015, background): “The statistic that few family firms are handed down to the grandchildren of the founder is one possible indicator of the changing goals of the family over time.(27) As a result, there is a need for careful negotiation among owners and managers to resolve potential conflicts between goals that may co”
Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms (2010, background): “So firms with family CEOs may outperform firms with non-family CEOs (who may even be professionally more qualified) (Lee et al., 2003).”
The Transaction Cost Economics Theory of the Family Firm: Family–Based Human Asset Specificity and the Bifurcation Bias (2012, neutral): “As a result, nonfamily managers, who have not been socialized into the company since birth and therefore do not possess the highly idiosyncratic knowledge specific to family insiders (Lee et al., 2003), face higher entry barriers when it comes to assuming key roles within the company.”