Auctioning divisible goods

By James J. D. Wang, Jaime F. Zender. 2002

280 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/960fe2bac98c1c0f8d20faa9811de9a850ffc2c8

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Kjell G. Nyborg
2. Ilan Kremer
3. Matti Keloharju
4. Kristian Rydqvist
5. Ross Baldick
6. William W. Hogan
7. Talat S. Genc
8. Dusist Niyato

In Marketing

1. Ilan Kremer
2. Ross Baldick
3. William W. Hogan
4. Kjell G. Nyborg
5. Talat S. Genc
6. Jean-Pierre Hubaux
7. Xavier Vives
8. Zhu Han

In Safety Research

1. Ilan Kremer
2. Ross Baldick
3. William W. Hogan
4. Kjell G. Nyborg
5. Talat S. Genc
6. Xavier Vives

Citations in the corpus

• Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions (2004, methodology): “This paper has studied underpricing in uniform price auctions, using the theoretical framework of Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993).”
• Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions (2005, background): “The reason for this can be understood by looking at the general solution to Kyle’s model, which has been shown by Wang and Zender (2002) to be (in inverse form):8 p(q) = " 1− µ q a ¶N−1# v̄ − " 1− µ q a ¶N−2# µN − 1 N − 2 ¶ ρσ2q, (10) where a is an arbitrary positive constant.”
• Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information (2008, unknown): “Kyle (1989) and Wang and Zender (2002) consider a common value model with noise.”
• Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions (2002, unknown): “Finally, (23) shows that the seller’s profit is higher than in A1.”
• Auction-Based Spectrum Sharing (2006, background): “Our approach is similar to a share auction (see [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] and the references therein), or divisible auction, where a perfectly divisible good is split among bidders whose payments depend solely on the bids.”
• Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium (2009, methodology): “The other methods, such as the one in Wang and Zender [21], lead to the same SFE conditions.”
• Capacity Constrained Supply Function Equilibrium Models of Electricity Markets: Stability, Non- decreasing constraints, and Function Space Iterations (2002, background): “Klemperer and Meyer’s work is in some respects similar in flavor to the auctions of shares literature and similar results can be found, for example, in [2, 3, 4].”