Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions

By Marco LiCalzi, Alessandro Pavan. 2002

133 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/17ca215ec261aa5c8b56a49cabba5df1576a2455

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Larry Katz
2. Hunt Allcott
3. Magali A. Delmas
4. Omar Isaac Asensio
5. C. Cattaneo
6. Stefano DellaVigna
7. George Loewenstein
8. Cass R. Sunstein

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Larry Katz
2. Hunt Allcott

In Marketing

1. Larry Katz
2. Hunt Allcott

Citations in the corpus

• Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information (2008, unknown): “2 Back and Zender (2001) and LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) show how the auction can be designed to limit those collusive equilibria.”
• Real Time Pricing and Electricity Markets (2009, background): “…evidence that rms learn over time towards pro t- 17There is also a series of papers on how "adjustable supply" in multi-unit ordinary auctions reduces buyers market power and thus can eliminate low-price equilibria, including Back and Zender (2001), LiCalzi and Pavan (2005), and McAdams (2006).”