Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions

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Modeling Electricity Auctions (2002, methodology): “For an analysis of auctions with both a quantity multiple and a positive tick size, see Nyborg (2001) supra note 20, Section 4.2.”
Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions (2005, background): “The empirical proxy for the quantity-weighted standard deviation (13) is given by (18) above.”
Designing Electricity Auctions (2004, unknown): “[23] Kremer, I and K.”
Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules (2004, background): “Kremer and Nyborg (2002) shows that underpricing may also be eliminated under the standard allocation rule by choosing a relatively small tick size for prices and a relatively large quantity multiple.”
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions (2002, background): “Since all buyers pay the same price, the uniform-price auction is analogous to a Walrasian market, with the only difference that demand schedules are submitted strategically; see Nyborg (2002).”
Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information (2008, background): “Back and Zender (1993) and Kremer and Nyborg (2004) obtain related results for Treasury auctions.”
Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions (2011, background): “Kremer and Nyborg (2004) show that, in a complete information framework, this alternative rationing rule encourages competition and may thus be preferred.”