Systems and levels: Dual-system theories and the personal- subpersonal distinction ∗

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EPISTEMIC ANXIETY AND ADAPTIVE INVARIANTISM (2010, methodology): “To use an example of Keith Frankish’s, “What is 9 times 11?” is answered automatically, and “What is 9 divided by 11?” requires effortful sequential thought (Frankish, 2009).”
The complexity of developmental predictions from dual process models (2011, background): “In order to be ecumenical and fair, we will begin by discussing some confusions in a developmental study of our own, that by Kokis, Macpherson, 3 We follow most cognitive scientists in deeming rationality a personal entity and not a subpersonal one (Bermudez, 2001; Davies, 2000; Frankish, 2009).”
On the distinction between rationality and intelligence: Implications for understanding individual differences in reasoning. (2012, background): “It should also be noted that in the view of rationality taken in this chapter, rationality is an intentional-level personal entity and not an algorithmic-level subpersonal one (Bermudez, 2001; Davies, 2000; Frankish, 2009; Stanovich, 1999, 2009a).”