Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software

By David Lie, C. A. Thekkath, Mark Mitchell, Patrick Lincoln, Dan Boneh, John C. Mitchell, Mark A. Horowitz. 2000

689 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

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The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

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In Computer Networks and Communications

In Signal Processing

Citations in the corpus

Pinocchio: Nearly Practical Verifiable Computation (2013, background): “A large body of work verifies computation by assuming the worker employs secure hardware [9–15].”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, methodology): “Several systems combine hardware-based isolation [37], [46], [59] with trusted system software [17], [28], [36], [38],”
Sealed-Glass Proofs: Using Transparent Enclaves to Prove and Sell Knowledge (2017, methodology): “The use of trusted hardware for secure computation dates back to platforms such as XOM [57], Aegis [16] or TPM-based solutions such as Flicker [18].”
Formal Abstractions for Attested Execution Secure Processors (2017, background): “Although there have been numerous proposals for the design of trusted hardware, and these designs vary vastly in terms of architectural choices, instruction sets, implementation details, cryptographic suites, as well as adversarial models they promise to defend against — amazingly, it appears that s”
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven (2014, background): “Notwithstanding prior research [9, 12, 31, 34, 44], hardware security modules (HSMs) [1, 53], trusted platform modules (TPMs) [57] and ARM TrustZone [5] are presently the main hardware sources of trust on commodity platforms, and we focus on them.”
Security as a new dimension in embedded system design (2004, background): “To realize this goal, we should look beyond the basic security functions of an embedded system and provide defenses against broad classes of attacks — all without compromising performance, area, energy consumption, cost and usability.”
Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets (2016, background): “Many systems guarantee secure execution of processes in presence of un-trusted OSes, either at the hardware or software level.”
Obfuscation of executable code to improve resistance to static disassembly (2003, methodology): “Even greater security may be obtained by maintaining the software in encrypted form and decrypting it as needed during execution, as suggested by Aucsmith [1]; or using specialized hardware, as discussed by Lie et al. [ 16 ].”
Watermarking, Tamper-Proofing, and Obfuscation-Tools for Software Protection (2002, neutral): “The available art for hardware-assisted security is based on memory devices such as floppy disks [31], CD-ROMs [97], modern removable storage media (hard disk, recordable DVD, secure digital memory card) and video playback units [1]; secure processors [50]; smart cards [10]; and hardware dongles [15”
NoHype: virtualized cloud infrastructure without the virtualization (2010, methodology): “Finally, hardware architectures have been proposed to enable running applications without trusting the operating system [33, 34, 35, 36, 10].”
Improving Cost, Performance, and Security of Memory Encryption and Authentication (2006, methodology): “In direct encryption, an encryption algorithm such as triple DES or AES [3] is used to encrypt each cache block as it is written back to memory and decrypt the block when it enters the processor chip again [5, 10, 11].”
CloudVisor: retrofitting protection of virtual machines in multi-tenant cloud with nested virtualization (2011, background): “For examples, many architectural enhancements [36, 61] have been proposed to support trusted execution of an application within an untrusted operating system.”
AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing (2003, background): “The SCM table can be entirely stored on the processor as in [10], however, this severely restricts the number of tamper-evident processes.”
Raccoon: Closing Digital Side-Channels through Obfuscated Execution (2015, neutral): “08: : "=r" (result) 09: : "r" (pred), "r" (t_val), "r" (f_val) 10: : "cc" 11: ); 12: return result; 13: }”
A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves (2017, methodology): “The XOM [39] architecture introduced the concept of isolated software containers managed by untrusted host software, and employed encryption and HMAC to protect DRAM.”
Innovative instructions and software model for isolated execution (2013, background): “These include XOM [6], AEGIS [7], SP [8], Bastion [9], and HyperWall [10].”