Sealed-Glass Proofs: Using Transparent Enclaves to Prove and Sell Knowledge

By Florian Tramèr, Fan Zhang, Huang Lin, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Ari Juels, Elaine Shi. 2017

121 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture, Information Systems, Privacy & Security

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Citations in the corpus

Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2019, background): “In particular, when the verifier knows (or can reproduce) which binary should run in the secure enclaves, TEEs will be able to provide a notion of integrity (the code execution cannot be affected, except by the inputs), and an attestation (the TEE can prove that a specific binary is executing and wh”
Slalom: Fast, Verifiable and Private Execution of Neural Networks in Trusted Hardware (2018, methodology): “While SGX covers many software and hardware attack vectors, there is a large and prominent class of side-channel attacks that it explicitly does not address (Costan & Devadas, 2016; Tramèr et al., 2017).”
Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts (2018, neutral): “Ekiden is compatible with existing TEE defenses [17, 58, 68, 72, 89].”
Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution (2018, unknown): “This observation rules out transparent, integrity-only enclaved execution paradigms [56], and directly threatens an emerging ecosystem of untrusted cloud environments [4] and innovative blockchain technologies [25].”
Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX (2020, background): “By directly breaking ISA-level processor semantics, Plundervolt ultimately undermines even relaxed “transparent enclaved execution” paradigms [66] that solely require integrity of enclave computations while assuming unbounded side-channel leakage.”
Formal Abstractions for Attested Execution Secure Processors (2017, background): “[71] then propose a new model which they call the transparent enclave model.”
ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution (2017, background): “Several recently proposed SGX systems [39, 40, 41, 13, 42, 43, 44, 45] consider an adversary model with an untrusted OS.”
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution (2018, unknown): “, [3], [55], [22], [64], [93], [75], [58], [74], [96]), and new software tools or frameworks (e.”
Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange using Trusted Hardware (2017, methodology): “Trusted hardware can also be used to achieve significant efficiency gains for well-known cryptographic primitives such as functional encryption [34], secure MPC [71], and NIZK in the presence of side-channel attacks [83].”
Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution (2017, background): “As a result, several authors have expressed their concerns on side-channel vulnerabilities in a PMA setting in general, and the page fault channel in particular [12, 9, 43, 39, 7].”
Towards Scaling Blockchain Systems via Sharding (2018, background): “eration, and signature. In other words, enclaves have no private memory except for areas related to its private keys, i.e., they run in a seal-glassed proof model where their execution is transparent [45]. This model admits recent side-channel attacks on SGX that leak enclave data [12]. 4 1 7 19 31 ”
CrypTFlow: Secure TensorFlow Inference (2019, methodology): “We also implement the techniques in [59] for optimizing communication involving enclaves.”
REM: Resource-Efficient Mining for Blockchains (2017, background): “Otherwise, compromised SGX-enabled CPUs would allow an attacker to generate PoUWs at will, and both unfairly accrete revenue and disrupt the security of the blockchain [29, 75, 79].”