Raccoon: Closing Digital Side-Channels through Obfuscated Execution

By Ashay Rane, Calvin Lin, Mohit Tiwari. 2015

314 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

1. Florian Tramèr
2. Dan Boneh
3. Fan Zhang
4. Ben Fisch
5. O. Ohrimenko
6. Elaine Shi
7. Jean-Pierre Hubaux
8. Ari Juels

Citations in the corpus

• Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts (2018, neutral): “Ekiden is compatible with existing TEE defenses [17, 58, 68, 72, 89].”
• HOP: Hardware makes Obfuscation Practical (2017, methodology): “The crux of the problem is that many performance optimizations in real systems (and related work in secure processors [18], [40], [45]) hinge on exploiting programdependent behavior.”
• Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks (2018, background): “prone [16] while automated ones incur several-fold performance overheads [48].”
• T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017, background): “Broadly, two types of countermeasures have been proposed , namely, obfuscating memory accesses [9] [49] [54] and isolating page faults [19] [54], but both are limited in terms of performance or compatibility.”
• Packet Chasing: Spying on Network Packets over a Cache Side-Channel (2019, unknown): “These mitigation strategies include identifying the leakage in software [48], observing anamalous cache behavior [49], [56], closing channels at hardware design time [41]–[45], dynamic cache partitioning [45], [46], [50], strictly reserving physical cores to security-sensitive threads [51], randomiz”
• Sealed-Glass Proofs: Using Transparent Enclaves to Prove and Sell Knowledge (2017, background): “A much more challenging goal is extending side-channel protections to arbitrary computations [3], [9]–[13] as the resulting performance degradation is non-negligible [10], [14], [15] and it remains unclear whether data leaks can truly be fully eliminated.”
• This Paper Is Included in the Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (osdi '16). Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data (unknown): “Orthogonal techniques [27, 31, 42, 61, 78] may be used to mitigate software bugs that unintentionally leak secret input data to a computation’s output.”
• IRON: Functional Encryption using Intel SGX (2017, background): “It has not yet been demonstrated that this is possible to achieve practically for generic programs given the current side-channel attacks on SGX, though some effort in this direction was made in [49] and demonstrated on SGX-like special purpose hardware in [46].”
• SgxPectre Attacks: Leaking Enclave Secrets via Speculative Execution (2018, methodology): “, using compiler-assisted approaches to eliminate secret-dependent control flows and data flows [50, 17, 62],ortodiversifyorrandomizememoryaccesspatterns at runtime to conceal the true execution traces [19, 55]. However, as the vulnerabilities in the enclave programs that enable SGXPECTRE Attacks are ”
• Oblivious Multi-Party Machine Learning on Trusted Processors (2016, methodology): “However, such tools either use a backend that would require careful adaption for the constrained SGX environment (for example, GhostRider [37] defines its own source language and ObliVM [38] translates code into circuits) or they are not as optimized as our approach (for example, Raccoon [53] always”
• SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Trusted Execution (2019, background): “In Raccoon [81], Path ORAM hides array accesses that depend on secrets.”
• Detecting Privileged Side-Channel Attacks in Shielded Execution with Déjà Vu (2017, methodology): “Automated program transformation to eliminate the secret-dependent control flows or data flows have been attempted in several prior works [38, 12, 35, 13, 43], but due to the high performance overhead (e.”
• Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016, methodology): “Raccoon [44] always executes both paths of a conditional branch, such that no branch history will be leaked.”