AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing

By G. Suh, Dwaine E. Clarke, Blaise Gassend, Marten van Dijk, Srini Devadas. 2003

619 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

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Citations in the corpus

Practical Secure Aggregation for Federated Learning on User-Held Data (2016, background): “Relying only on the non-maliciousness of the bootstrapping round also constitutes minimization of trust: the code implementing this stage is small and could be publicly audited, outsourced to a trusted third party, or implemented via a trusted compute platform offering a remote attestation capabilit”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, background): “[46], [59] with trusted system software [17], [28], [36], [38], [54], [58], [69], which is typically a trusted hypervisor.”
Innovative instructions and software model for isolated execution (2013, background): “Other names and brands may be claimed as the property of others.”
Architecture for protecting critical secrets in microprocessors (2005, methodology): “AEGIS [33] has mechanisms similar to XOM, but provides stronger memory integrity guarantees.”
Sealed-Glass Proofs: Using Transparent Enclaves to Prove and Sell Knowledge (2017, methodology): “Many prior works have proposed using trusted hardware for secure outsourcing of computations, including protection of cryptographic keys (Flicker) [18], Digital Rights Management (Aegis) [16], Map-Reduce jobs (M2R) [15], [19], data analytics (VC3) [20], machine learning [14], and even legacy Windows”
I Know What You See: Power Side-Channel Attack on Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators (2018, background): “For instance, they may adopt secure processors, like AEGIS [34], to keep the incoming data confidential both in memory and on the disk.”
CloudVisor: retrofitting protection of virtual machines in multi-tenant cloud with nested virtualization (2011, background): “For examples, many architectural enhancements [36, 61] have been proposed to support trusted execution of an application within an untrusted operating system.”
Security as a new dimension in embedded system design (2004, background): “To realize this goal, we should look beyond the basic security functions of an embedded system and provide defenses against broad classes of attacks — all without compromising performance, area, energy consumption, cost and usability.”
Efficient memory integrity verification and encryption for secure processors (2003, methodology): “The trusted computing base (TCB) consists of the processor chip and optionally1 some core parts of the operating system that plays the part of the Nexus in Palladium [4] or the security kernel in AEGIS [21].”
Secure program execution via dynamic information flow tracking (2004, background): “Secure processors such as XOM [10] and AEGIS [16] target secure execution environments for programs.”
SecChisel Framework for Security Verification of Secure Processor Architectures (2019, background): “A number of secure processor architectures have been designed over the last decade, e.g., XOM [15], AEGIS [19], SP [11], Bastion [8], or HyperWall [20].”
HOP: Hardware makes Obfuscation Practical (2017, methodology): “On the other hand, proposals from the architecture community such as Intel SGX [42], AEGIS [53], XOM [38], Bastion [13], Ascend [18] and GhostRider [40] are more practical, but their designs do not achieve cryptographic definition of obfuscation.”
Security in embedded systems: Design challenges (2004, methodology): “…to preserve the privacy and integrity of code and data associated with a given application or process [Lie et al. 2000], HW/SW techniques to preserve the privacy and integrity of data throughout the memory hierarchy [Suh et al. 2003], execution of encrypted code [Best 1981; Kuhn 1997], and so on.”
Intel SGX Explained (2016, methodology): “However, SGX relies on a version-based Merkle tree, inspired by Aegis [174], and adds an innovative twist that allows the operating system to dynamically shape the Merkle tree.”
Formal Abstractions for Attested Execution Secure Processors (2017, background): “Although there have been numerous proposals for the design of trusted hardware, and these designs vary vastly in terms of architectural choices, instruction sets, implementation details, cryptographic suites, as well as adversarial models they promise to defend against — amazingly, it appears that s”
Survey of Attacks and Defenses on Edge-Deployed Neural Networks (2019, background): “Here, the defender trusts some type of hardware device, which is built with certain security measures, as in the case of secure enclaves [48], [82], [83] or secure accelerators [23].”
Sanctum: Minimal Hardware Extensions for Strong Software Isolation (2016, background): “Aegis [49] relies on a trusted security kernel, handles untrusted memory, and identifies the software in a container by computing a cryptographic hash over the initial contents of the container.”