Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets

By Shweta Shinde, Zheng Leong Chua, Viswesh Narayanan, Prateek Saxena. 2016

234 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Signal Processing

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Citations in the corpus

Slalom: Fast, Verifiable and Private Execution of Neural Networks in Trusted Hardware (2018, background): “Mitigations for these side-channel attacks are being developed (Shinde et al., 2016; Shih et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Intel Corp., 2018) but a truly secure solution might require some architectural changes, e.g., as in the proposed Sanctum processor (Costan et al., 2016).”
SgxPectre Attacks: Leaking Enclave Secrets via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “ectural side-channel attacks. Previously, various micro-architectural side-channel attacks have been demonstrated on SGX, which CPU cache attacks [7, 19, 21, 60], BTB attacks [44], page-table attacks [64, 74, 82], cache-DRAM attacks [77], etc. SgxPectre Attacks are different because they target memo”
Detecting Privileged Side-Channel Attacks in Shielded Execution with Déjà Vu (2017, background): “[45] against libgcrypt, the attacker leveraged page faults to determine the path taken through the ec_mul routine; since the path taken is determined by an exponent bit, determining the path determines the exponent bit (i.”
EnclaveDB: A Secure Database Using SGX (2018, background): “Side channels are a serious concern with trusted hardware [17], [18], [19], [20], and building efficient side channel protection for high performance systems like EnclaveDB remains an open problem.”
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution (2018, methodology): “Previously, various micro-architectural side-channel attacks have been demonstrated on SGX, which CPU cache attacks [7, 19, 21, 60], BTB attacks [44], page-table attacks [64, 74, 82], cache-DRAM attacks [77], etc .”
A compiler and verifier for page access oblivious computation (2017, methodology): “Therefore, the defense in [17] potentially leaks a bit of information on each page access, which is problematic for long-running enclaves.”
Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution (2017, background): “[40] demonstrated that the page fault channel is sufficiently strong to extract cryptographic key bits from unmodified versions of OpenSSL and Libgcrypt.”
Hacking in Darkness: Return-oriented Programming against Secure Enclaves (2017, background): “Several authors [26, 33, 38] have identified side channels that can leak large amounts of sensitive information out of the application’s isolated execution”
Komodo: Using verification to disentangle secure-enclave hardware from software (2017, background): “Komodo is not vulnerable to controlled-channel attacks [78, 88] merely by virtue of the fact that it does not yet support demand-paging of enclave memory.”
Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical (2017, methodology): “[62] proposed application hardening as a mitigation technique against page fault based side channel.”
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX (2017, background): “It has been shown in previous studies that page-level memory access patterns can leak secrets of enclave programs under a variety of scenarios [39], [35].”
A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves (2017, background): “AdversaryMCP : TheMCP adversary’s capabilities are extended beyond MC to include observation of the virtual to physical mappings and associated access/permission bits for each virtual address. obsMCPe (σ ) λσ .”
Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs (2018, background): “Side channels are a serious concern with trusted hardware [10, 12, 22, 38, 45, 50] and building efficient counter measures remains an open problem.”
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks (2017, unknown): “Symmetric keys can be generated at runtime from a secure random entropy (using RDRAND instruction) and/or transferred through a public secure channel without the attacker knowledge.”
SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution (2017, background): “We must note that even though we concentrate on memory safety, there are other, insider attack vectors (orthogonal to our work) where a malicious OS tries to deceive the shielded application [30, 60, 71, 83].”