CloudVisor: retrofitting protection of virtual machines in multi-tenant cloud with nested virtualization

By Fengzhe Zhang, Jin Chen, Haibo Chen, Binyu Zang. Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, 2011

434 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/85d555f7ce19740b4fc656ff797623c6e1513018

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Citations in the corpus

SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs (2017, methodology): “There are several approaches to shield applications from untrusted privileged software in the software manner [22, 25, 35, 63].”
Cloud security issues and challenges: A survey (2017, methodology): “Issues in virtual machine Vm hopping, Cross-VM attack Side-channel attack Covert-channel attack VM data exfiltration attack Memory deduplication issues Malware injection Entropy generation strength Entropy depletion VM reset problem, consistency, re-usage VM rollback [76] [185] [16] [134] [195] [29]”
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’16). (positive): “TrustVi-sor [40] and CloudVisor [66] avoid the problem of frequent TPM usage by including the hypervisor within the TCB using remote attestation.”
Detecting Privileged Side-Channel Attacks in Shielded Execution with Déjà Vu (2017, background): “There is a long history of research on shielded execution on untrusted operating systems [31, 46, 9, 10, 37, 54, 42, 56, 22, 11, 14, 30].”
The Efficient Server Audit Problem, Deduplicated Re-execution, and the Web (2017, background): “Furthermore, this issue exists in all systems that “check” an untrusted lower layer’s return values for validity [14, 17, 28, 46, 95].”
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven (2014, background): “Previous research relied on trusted hypervisors to protect an application from a malicious OS [11, 25, 54, 60, 63], but cannot protect against a hypervisor controlled by a malicious or compromised cloud provider.”
M2R: Enabling Stronger Privacy in MapReduce Computation (2015, methodology): “Overshadow [14] and CloudVisor [63] are techniques with large TCB, whereas Flicker [38] and TrustVisor [39] reduce the TCB at the cost of performance.”
Security in cloud computing: Opportunities and challenges (2015, methodology): “The idea of decoupling the security and VM management to protect the runtime environment of the VM is utilized in CloudVisor [129].”