A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves
By Pramod Subramanyan, Rohit Sinha, Ilia A. Lebedev, Srini Devadas, Sanjit A. Seshia. 2017
151 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture, Privacy & Security, Signal Processing
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Martin Jaggi
- Jakub Konecný
- Qiang Yang
- Peter Kairouz
- Peter Richtárik
- Ananda Theertha Suresh
- Sebastian U. Stich
- Yang Liu
In Hardware and Architecture
- Dawn Song
- Dan Boneh
- Farinaz Koushanfar
- Srini Devadas
- Jeyavijayan Rajendran
- Jianyu Wang
- Florian Tramèr
- Arjun Nitin Bhagoji
In Privacy & Security
- Peter Kairouz
- Badih Ghazi
- Rasmus Pagh
- Dan Boneh
- Adrià Gascón
- Qiang Yang
- H. Brendan McMahan
- Ziteng Sun
In Signal Processing
- Dawn Song
- Srini Devadas
- Dan Boneh
- Florian Tramèr
- Ilia A. Lebedev
- Rasmus Pagh
- Badih Ghazi
- Shweta Shinde
Citations in the corpus
- Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2019, background): “In particular, when the verifier knows (or can reproduce) which binary should run in the secure enclaves, TEEs will be able to provide a notion of integrity (the code execution cannot be affected, except by the inputs), and an attestation (the TEE can prove that a specific binary is executing and wh”
- Robust Aggregation for Federated Learning (2019, background): “, secure enclaves [81] in conjunction with our approach could guarantee Byzantine robustness in federated learning.”
- Slalom: Fast, Verifiable and Private Execution of Neural Networks in Trusted Hardware (2018, background): “We refer the interested reader to (Pass et al., 2017; Fisch et al., 2017; Subramanyan et al., 2017) for different attempts at such formalisms.”
- Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments (2020, background): “A careful and ground-up design with verified components [43, 55, 69] may provide stronger guarantees and Keystone can help explore designs which combine these with hardware protection [41, 85].”
- DAWG: A Defense Against Cache Timing Attacks in Speculative Execution Processors (2018, result): “Figure 11 illustrates DAWG’s non-interference property, which can be proven in a manner similar to the proof for the Sanctum processor’s cache partitioning scheme [50].”
- HardFails: Insights into Software-Exploitable Hardware Bugs (2019, methodology): “A formal verification methodology for SGX and Sanctum en-claves under a limited adversary was introduced in [67].”