Oligarchic family control, social economic outcomes, and the quality of government

By Kathy S. Fogel. 2006

223 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Information Systems, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2588474f9474321ca5c39f8a91b6931eca2c773d

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Citations in the corpus

Familial capitalism in global institutional contexts: Implications for corporate governance and entrepreneurship in East Asia (2009, background): “New entrepreneurs, as well as firms with significant needs for outside financing, would benefit from legal reform that better protects shareholders, but their voices are rarely as influential as those of publicly traded family firms in the political debate (Burkhart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003: 2193;”
An anatomy of state control in the globalization of state-owned enterprises (2015, background): “…2013) in “going global” via intensive capital control, which is prevalent among bureaucratic and interventionist governments in emerging economies (Fogel, 2006). ii However, the government gives more discretionary power to the degree to which SOEs want to globalize in the later stages of…”
The Resilient Family Firm: Stakeholder Outcomes and Institutional Effects (2015, background): “Research in the agency theory tradition on this latter point tends to view FCFs in a negative light, and is especially suspicious of coordinated action between FCFs and nonmarket actors (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005), finding that FCFs have injurious effects on economic growth and the development”
International experience and FDI location choices of Chinese firms: The moderating effects of home country government support and host country institutions (2014, methodology): “The ICRG investment profile is an index from the ICRG which has been used in a number of papers on FDI and institutional environments (e.g., Durnev, Errunza, & Molchanov, 2009; Fogel, 2006), and ranges from 0 (high expro-”
Varieties of institutional systems: A contextual taxonomy of understudied countries (2016, background): “In many countries, firms often exist to provide for, promote, and secure the national standing of family dynasties (Fogel, 2006).”
Global corporate governance: On the relevance of firms’ ownership structure (2016, background): “On the one hand, family firms are singled out as shown by Fogel (2006)’s empirical cross-national study of largest corporations in”
Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms (2010, background): “concentration of ownership and control in the hands of families may be bad for the value of large firms (Fogel, 2006; Morck et al., 2005).”
Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence (2012, background): “Table 1 provides summary statistics of our sample firms as of the end of fiscal years 1996 and 1997, 5 Fogel (2006) shows that greater oligarchic family control over large corporations, which is the case for chaebol firms, is associated with worse social economic outcomes.”
Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? (2011, methodology): “We measure institutional variables based on La Porta et al. (1998), whose index has been widely used and validated in recent cross-country studies (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Fogel, 2006; Johnson et al., 2000; Peng & Jiang, 2010; Schneper & Guillen, 2004).”